November, 2007


9
Nov 07

Facebook’s Beacon and Boundary States

It’s been interesting to watch the critiques of Facebook’s Beacon roll in. Erick Schonfeld, official Techcrunch voice of reason, points out the somewhat absurd conjecture that social ads are more relevant. Across the web, there seems to be general agreement – social input helps in times of need, like when we need a recommendation of a good mechanic, but other times it’s just spam. Today I want to explore Beacon from a slightly different angle – I want to look at how Beacon will affect Facebook users’ conceptions of privacy and space.

Let’s first flash back to the Facebook Newsfeeds. When Facebook introduced the Newsfeeds, there was a tremendous backlash as users were confronted with the privacy implications of the tool. Facebook responded in a typical corporate fashion, stating that no new information was being put out there, people could see your information if they visited your profile, etc. Of course, what Facebook failed to realize is that privacy is both qualitative and quantitative. Privacy theorist Irwin Altman describes our conception of privacy as boundary states; Facebook reshaped a number of these boundaries with Newsfeed. Helen Nissenbaum explores it another way, framing privacy as contextual integrity – we project ourselves and what we share into contexts; Facebook forced us to realize that our friend/disclosure context was not just the 5-10 people we interact with daily, but the 500 other “friends” we’ve added through the years.

Therefore, Newsfeed wasn’t just a privacy shift in Facebook, it was a cultural shift. A friendship, the primary action in the site, was no longer the one-time exchange of social capital; it became an invitation to be present in a user’s day-to-day activities. This remapping of friendship was the locus of the revolt, as millions of users pondered just who was seeing their information on an everyday basis. As one might imagine, among these users privacy and self-regulation shot up; I observed a 20% jump in privacy between samples in 2006 and 2007.

Beacon introduces another of these cultural shifts. In the case of Newsfeed, Facebook users were forced to reconceptualize their audience. Nissenbaum’s Contextual Integrity theory explains our reaction to Newsfeeds; the reshaping of privacy norms is a traumatic event. Beacon is somewhat different, so I want to lean on Altman for my explanation. With Beacon, Facebook’s boundaries are remapped. Users will be forced to realize that their Facebook identity “follows” them through the web. As a result, Facebook users will be forced to reevaluate all of their activities on the social web.

Let’s not fall into the quantitative privacy misdirection. With Beacon, you’ve got control over what you share; with careful control, you can even prevent any Beacon stories from showing up in your newsfeed. Just as with Newsfeed, there isn’t a quantitative privacy shift. But there is a very, very significant qualitative shift.

Due to the general “walled garden” nature of the web, we naturally map our behavior into domains. We can be one person on Facebook, another person on Myspace, and yet another person at Flickr, YouTube and Digg. The ClaimID-type idea of “profile linking” is still very new, with only a very small number of us wanting to map a consistent identity between sites.

For the past six months or three years, we’ve been cultivating our persona in Facebook. We’re used to boundaries, we know where Facebook ends, and we can segment Facebook as a “part” of our social web experience. With Beacon, Facebook users will be forced to confront the interconnection of their Facebook identity with the social web; the boundaries that existed previously no longer apply. Altman argues that our cognition of privacy boundaries are based on observable, mappable phenomena. We know that our homes are private because people can’t see through walls. With Facebook Beacon, the walls that we used to understand are gone – our identity, designed for a single place with focused interaction, now follows us everywhere. This is extremely significant.

In a class discussion yesterday, Terrell Russell summed it up nicely: The social web now has landmines. When we browse sites, we’re forced to wonder “Will this show up in Facebook.” And what happens when the momentary flux in Facebook’s systems gets your settings wrong, and something you didn’t expect shows up in your Newsfeed? I don’t want to base my argument on contingencies; we’ll be mindful of accidential information leaks, but the major problem with be our confrontation with our “Facebook selves” anywhere and everywere. Even though Zappos or Epicurious may not have our “data”, we’ll be constantly reminded that they “know of” our Facebook selves.

The Facebook team stakes its value proposition on the notion that our Facebook identities are our real selves. This is false; because we use our real names, we are not our “real selves.” Identity is performed and crafted in Facebook; our selves are as real in Facebook as they are in Myspace and Friendster before. Beacon challenges this notion, reminding us anywhere and everywhere we go that we’ve got to keep our identity performance up.

Critical point, marketers: If our identity performance infects all of our buying decisions, will this help or hurt your sales? That is, if I had to think about what everyone thought of all of my purchases, would I self-regulate my purchasing behavior? Would I treat myself less, buying less guilty-pleasure stuff? Do I actually want to have to go through this decision process every time I buy anything, being forced to process what my friend group will think about me?

Just like Icarus flying too close to the sun, Facebook’s fallacy of “real” identity is leading the company into very dangerous territory. Facebook believes in the transparent society; what they fail to realize is that the transparent society only benefits the power elite. With Facebook’s Harvard and Stanford pedigrees, its easy to see how groupthink and cultural preconceptions inform their decision making. Beacon is an inflection point. As we are confronted with the loss of boundaries, our notions of privacy and space will be reshaped. We’re about to wade into some dangerous water – Facebook and its marketing partners should pay close attention.

Update: Via Brian Oberkirch, directions on how to block Beacon. Anyone know how to implement this block with NoScript?


8
Nov 07

Digital Identity Talk Tonight

Via Dave Johnson, news that Pat Patterson, federation architect for Sun Microsystems will be speaking at tonight’s TriLug. I’m going to make every effort to attend. Dave’s note follows:

Tri-LUG announcement: Pat Patterson from Sun Microsystems will provide us with a developer perspective on digital identity, starting from the emergence of LDAP in the 90s, through single sign-on, SAML and the Liberty Alliance protocols to recent developments such as OpenID, Cardspace and OAuth. The emphasis will be on understanding the protocols and how they are implemented in the real world, with a particular focus on deciding which (if any!) approach to select for a given project.

Pat Patterson is a federation architect at Sun Microsystems, focusing on federation, identity-enabled Web services and OpenSSO, Sun’s open-source implementation of those technologies. Pat’s blog centers on identity-related topics.

Speaker:   Pat PattersonTitle:     Digital Identity from LDAP to SAML and beyondDate/time: 7PM Thursday Nov. 8, 2007Location:  Red Hat HQ (map)          1801 Varsity Drive          Raleigh, North Carolina 27606          Tel: +1-919-754-3700

7
Nov 07

Perspectives on Facebook’s Beacon

I’m getting a little exhausted covering all of these “social” announcements by my watchlist companies, but Facebook brings us genuinely big news with the launch of Project Beacon and Social Ads. Erick Schoenfeld’s got the summary, here’s my couple-sentence version: SocialAds = deep targeting using your profile and network data, Project Beacon = your friends (and Facebook) know when you buy stuff on other websites.

Facebook has fulfilled its destiny: it is now Adbook. The data you share in Facebook is incredibly rich. Marketers can target based on your interests (You like Dylan? Buy the box set.) or your friends interests (Seven of your friends love Crocs, buy some Crocs.). Take the internal data, and mash it with the external data collected from Beacon – and you’ve got some seriously powerful targeting information.

What do the experts have to say? Doc Searls, who wrote the book on this stuff, is looking at Facebook’s announcements cautiously:

I get that Facebook really wants to understand people, and relationships. That’s a plus. So is any plan that gives Google competition in a category it has defined and all but owned completely over the last few years. Facebook is in a transcendently privileged position here… What we need is to equip demand with better ways of engaging supply. Not just better ways for supply to create and manipulate demand.

When I was at Harvard this summer, I was able to spend some time with Doc talking about his new endeavor, Project VRM. Facebook should listen to Doc; with Beacon and Social Ads, Facebook is trying to turn us all into “lifestyle marketers.” In Facebook’s dream world, I’ll know about every pair of Crocs you buy, in essence constantly barraging me with social purchasing opportunities. But that’s not what it’s about – just because ads are socially targeted, it doesn’t make me want more ads. Rather, Facebook should leverage this extremely powerful social information in my times of need – when I want to purchase something, give me my network’s opinion. As Doc describes it, this is “demand finding supply” rather than supply finding demand. Spamminess is the death of a network, socially targeted or not.

Nick Carr laments Adbook and the culture of peer marketers:

I like the way that Zuckerberg considers “media” and “advertising” to be synonymous. It cuts through the bullshit. It simplifies. Get over your MSM hangups, granddads. Editorial is advertorial. The medium is the message from our sponsor.

Marketing is conversational, says Zuckerberg, and advertising is social. There is no intimacy that is not a branding opportunity, no friendship that can’t be monetized, no kiss that doesn’t carry an exchange of value. The cluetrain has reached its last stop, its terminus, the end of the line.

And since everyone on Techmeme was saying the same thing, I found a blog from Facebook user and skeptic Matt Monihan, who is not clearly not a citizen-marketing Fan-sumer.

So, facebook is now taking a bold step towards pissing me off. Now, I have to think twice before I buy something stupid online. Will my friends be notified that I bought seasons 1 & 2 of project runway? What will they think?

Ahh, the things we have to worry about today. Anyway, this is big news. As I’ve stated, Facebook is on the march, and we can expect its membership to swell to 150-250M users over the next year or two. SocialAds and Beacon, just like Applications, will either improve or horribly break the user experience. Facebook must approach this new turn with caution, this is a critical moment.


5
Nov 07

Social Network Transitions

In my last post on ego-centric social networks, I briefly discussed social network transitions – What’s next after Facebook, etc. I want to flesh this discussion out, and I want to highlight the particular outlying place of ego-centric social networks on the social web.

To generalize, let’s consider two types of social networks: ego-centric and object-centric. An ego-centric social network places the individual as the core of the network experience (Orkut, Facebook, LinkedIn, Friendster) while the object-centric network places a non-ego element at the center of the network. Examples of object-centric networks include Flickr (social object: photograph), Dopplr (social object: travel instance), del.icio.us (social object: hyperlink) and Digg (social object: news item). The characteristics of ego- and object-centric networks are similar, and a human can certainly be considered a social object, but I delineate based on the significant experiential difference.

In a post I wrote exploring the network effect multiplier, the value proposition of object-centric social networks is described. Object-centric social networks offer core value, which is multiplied by network value. A great photo-hosting service like Flickr stands alone without the network, making it less susceptible to migration. An ego-centic network, on the other hand, has limited core-value – it’s value is largely in the network – making it highly susceptible to migration. We see this with Myspace: individuals lose little in terms of affordances when they migrate from Myspace to Facebook, making the main chore of migration network-reestablishment, a chore made ever-simpler as the migration cascade continues.

Of course, the problem with ego-centric networks lies in the fact network-reestablishment is the main chore. Talk to individuals joining Facebook today – what are they doing? They’re using inbox importers and searching to find their friends/ex-classmates/etc. It’s a game, it’s fun for a bit, but then (say it with me readers) “What’s next?” Yes, the what’s next moment occurs. This is not to say the network becomes useless: no, it’s very useful rolodex, and the newsfeeds introduce concepts of peripheral participation (or social surveillance), but the game is in essence over.

Now, a note of caution. Because ego-centric networks suffer from these vulnerabilities, it does not mean that all networks suffer from these vulnerabilities. Simply because Facebook and Friendster and Myspace are enormous it does not mean they speak for object-centric networks. Do you leave Flickr once you’ve uploaded all your photos, migrating to Zoomr to relive the experience? Of course not – object-centric networks perpetuate: the network parts of these sites just help with the perpetuation. Amy Jo Kim has discussed these “game functions” of networks extensively. The Facebook’s are the outliers of social software in many senses: size, use-behavior and lifespan.

The genesis of this post is a Techcrunch entry that talks about Facebook competitors, stating “startups might be wise to try capturing the niche that Facebook has intentionally left behind.” The blog goes on to review a number of Facebook-clone websites. As I’ve been noting for the past few months, Facebook has neglected its core audience, sacrificing college students for a broader audience. Even with this neglect, are we really supposed to believe that college students are going to start looking for and adopting a Facebook clone? This is simply not how social network transition occurs. It’s not a 1 for 1 switch.

In her essay exploring the Frienster-Myspace transition, danah boyd points to the “cluster effects” of Myspace. While Friendster and Myspace were co-evolving, both sites had their own cliques; we heard more about Friendster, but both sites had found an audience of dense, small-world clusters. It was the technical and managerial failures of Frienster that catalyzed the change, but the Friendster-Myspace transition couldnt have occurred if Myspace hadn’t been significantly primed. Friendster ex-pats moved to Myspace with increasing intensity as the networks cascaded, leaving Friendster a virtual ghost town.

What about the Myspace-Facebook transition? For the past three years, Facebook has been building dense clusters among a powerful class of users: college students. These students have wide networks, influencing peers, family members and marketers alike. There’s a ton of reasons to leave Myspace: the site is spammy, the interaction is ridiculous, it’s developed a stigma – but what can we trace the cascade to? Unlike Friendster, which just fell apart, Myspace is no longer situationally relevant. Users have got all they can from the system, they’ve exhausted the game-like experience, and there’s a viable alternative. Tech journalists, longing for a new beat after years of following Myspace, provided the coup d’grace – but none of this would have happened if Facebook hadn’t had strong initial clusters.

In Gladwellian language, we need a “tipping point” to fuel the transition cascade, but a network must first be populated with dense clusters for the transition to occur. Why is this? Pretty simply, only about 2.5% of us want to be the first onto the dance floor (or have the skills to find the dance floor, to abuse the metaphor). Facebook developed its clusters by exploiting tightly-knit communities (college campuses). Legend has it that the Myspace founders drove up and down California exploiting the tight-knit car-tweaker communities. These clusters provided the seeds for network growth. In every case, it was less about the affordances and feature set, more about the network and connecting tight clusters.

Therefore, the idea of college students jumping ship from Facebook to an empty Facebook-clone is pretty ridiculous. No matter how many features, or whatever, these nets have – the features aren’t the motivating factor. So what will be the next big thing? It will be a situationally relevant social experience that exploits dense, underserved clusters, treating the ego-centric aspects as a sub-feature. I’m almost certain that the experience will be mobile based, incorporating geolocational data and personal beacons. We’ll still want a rich social experience, but this experience will be secondary to the core situationally relevant need answered by the site (be it positional data or otherwise).

Important to understand is that, in the context of individual value, network size does not trump network relevance. This is where Facebook is so instructuve. Yes, we care about everyone we know, but we care more about the people we see every day. In the words of social capital theorists, we’re more interested in bonding than bridging social capital. As the next networks will trade in hyper-personal data, success requires the creation of network-enforced boundaries. Using Facebook’s gimmick is uninspired, there will be better ways of doing this in the future.

The next transition, however, is a few years off. We’ve got another 1-2 more years of significant Facebook growth. I expect their network will top off around 250-300M members before the next phase transition occurs. This will make Facebook an extremely wealthy company if they can capitalize before the transition point. Unfortunately, since they are ego-centric, there’s no way to sustain this network in the long-haul. However, this 1-2 year lead time will give mobile devices significant time to improve; the iPhone and iPhone clones will be in the hands of hundreds of millions of youth, priming the market for the next phase transition.

As I’ve stated, Facebook and the ego-centric social networks are the outliers in social software. And while its tempting to be the outlier (look, Techcrunch says Facebook is the 5th most valuable internet company ever!), its an ultimately impossible proposition. Object-centric networks, however, offer unlimited potential. Look at del.icio.us – the site is built on the fact that we can have a social experience around a hyperlink – and you can imagine hundreds and thousands of other possibilities. Don’t mistake this as a call for niche social networks – they only work if they’re situationally relevant – but rather as a call towards bringing smart experiences to the social objects we value. There’s still tremendous potential out there.


2
Nov 07

Google OpenSocial and Situational Relevance

Google’s OpenSocial has launched. You can read about it at the Google blog or the Google OpenSocial blog. You can also watch the “CampFire”, the pseudo-folksy release event that looks as if it was organized by Dubya’s press handlers. However, you’re probably sick of reading about OpenSocial, and as it is actually a pretty simple concept, you’re likely also sick of reading the same thing over and over. I’ll see what I can do to put an interesting spin on things.

Today, I’m going to talk a little bit about networks, Open Social and the problems open social can and can’t solve. I’m going to use the “situational relevance” frame, as it is particularly useful for this analysis.

First, let’s define the problem: Facebook is winning the social network wars. Even though Myspace has a trillion users, it is passe and Facebook is the new thing. As more people join Facebook, switching costs get lower, leading to a cascade effect. In terms of the diffusion of innovations curve, Facebook is now being heavily adopted by the “Early Majority”, indicating they’ve got a good one or two years left of substantial growth. In Google’s eyes, this is a major problem because it can’t really afford to “lose” at social networks for the next two years.

The OpenSocial value proposition goes something like this: Adopt opensocial, push your data into more places, and everyone wins. Consumers get their information needs answered in more places, and companies get their footprint in more places. And more or less, I agree – more relevant social services in more places is a win, but not in the Facebook-killing way Techcrunch expects.

Ego-centric social network sites all suffer from the “what’s next” problem. You log in, you find your friends, you connect, and then…what? Social networks solve this problem by being situationally relevant. On a college campus, where student real-world social networks are in unprecedented flux, Facebook is a social utility; the sheer amount of social information a student needs to manage as they mature their social networks makes Facebook invaluable. For the consultant or job seeker, LinkedIn maintains situational relevance by allowing one to activate weak ties in periods of need.

What happens when a social network is no longer situationally relevant? Use drops off. Social networks can combat this problem on a number of levels. Myspace dumped tons of exclusive media content into the site, so users would keep coming back once they negotiated their social networks. For non-SR users, Facebook developed the application platfom, betting that third party developers could make tools that would answer the varied needs of their userbase. Unfortunately, the gimmicky nature of the platform tools has undercut this approach somewhat, but this could very well change over time.

Try as they might, once ego-centric social networks lose situational relevance, its pretty much impossible for them to retain their status. Myspace users have exhausted the Myspace experience; they’ve done all they can do, they’ve found all the people they can find, so now its time to find a new context. We naturally migrate – we don’t hang out in the same bar or restaurant forever, so why would we assume behavior would be any different online?

Here’s where I get to my point: It’s all about networks. The coolest tools, the best exclusive media – these are only “fingers in the dam” to keep users in non-situationally relevant spaces. Networks naturally migrate from place to place – slowly at first, followed by a cascade as switching coss decrease – and no tools or content or affordances can really stop that.

OpenSocial, in essence, is a set of fingers to plug holes in the dam. It is a set of patches designed to keep users locked in to non-situationally relevant sites. Is it surprising that Myspace has signed on? Or any of the other secondary social networks? No. By injecting third-party content into sites, more needs will theoretically be answered, and users will be less likely to switch out. Unfortunately, this is not reality.

Ego-centric social networks are interesting because they can’t really compete with one another. Can you design a site that will steal Facebook’s core users? No. And is Facebook successful because it stole Myspace’s core users? No. A social network site must catch on with an unserved, influential demographic. In Facebook’s case, the demographic was college students who largely didn’t use Myspace and had never used Friendster or anything before that. Facebook found an unserved audience and accidentally became a giant. The next giant in the ego-centric space will do the same. Importantly, its not about the coolest features or the best content or cloning Facebook – it is about finding that unserved network.

Getting back to “its all about networks,” where OpenSocial fails is the proposition that by spreading content throughout the web, we’ll no longer want to cluster. That if Myspace or Bebo have just enough third-party widgets, Facebook will no longer matter. That couldn’t be further from the truth. We will naturally cluster in spaces, and companies are going to keep fighting tooth and nail to be the spaces where we cluster. The only way Google can win at ego-centric social networks is by creating one; but just as in real life, our social spaces are generally designed by people that “get us” – not the largest, most powerful company.

To put it bluntly, OpenSocial isn’t an anything “killer.” And OpenSocial isn’t going to save Myspace. What OpenSocial will do is add a layer of richness to applications, assuming that we don’t see another race-to-the-bottom like we saw over at Facebook (How long will it be before you can throw a sheep at your boss in LinkedIn?). Intelligent, well-curated third party apps will make sites better, but Google can’t really take credit for that. Ultimately, OpenSocial will not significantly impact Facebook and other “central” (in the network sense) sites, other than forcing the “media dialogue” ball into their court. And as Erick Schoenfeld (a voice of clarity on Techcrunch) puts it, Facebook could just adopt and snuff Google’s attempts to drive this media wedge. But frankly, it doesn’t really matter. No matter what Google does, Facebook is going to succesfully ride Roger’s S-Curve for the next couple years.

After that? Another thing will be popular, and it won’t be Facebook and I guarantee it won’t be Google. But it could be you. :)