Posts Tagged: firefox


22
Nov 08

Fixing Google with Adblock Plus

TechCrunch is right – Google, It Wasn’t Broke.  Google has rolled personalization at the item level into search, cluttering their elegant interface.  As far as I can tell, this affects all users who are logged in with a Google account (i.e. Gmail, etc), and there’s no way to opt out.  Now, I’m not against personalization – if you want it.  And while it appears there’s no way to opt out, you can make the cluttering icons disappear with Adblock plus (Firefox users).  To make the buttons and conversation icon disappear, add the following “element hiding rules” to Adblock Plus:

google.com#BUTTON(class=wci)
google.com#BUTTON(class=w10)
google.com#BUTTON(class=w20)

Voila, Google back to normal.

Update: TechCrunch reports that Google may be rolling this feature back, and it reports on a Greasemonkey script that accomplishes the same results as this Adblock Plus filter.  I’m not a Greasemonkey user so I’m not able to verify.


3
Sep 08

Chrome’s reconfiguration of the web’s geography

I’ve really enjoyed Chris Messina’s two recent posts on Chrome.  His background (Mozilla, Flock) and experience thinking about next generation UI’s and UE’s is on fine display; I particularly enjoy his reconcpetualization of the browser and its experience.

Factory City: Google Chrome and the future of browsers

Factory City: Musings on Chrome, the rebirth of the location bar and privacy in the cloud

In the second, more recent post, Chris discusses the cognitive break inherent in Chrome’s vision of the web.  In removing the URL bar in favor of a single search interface, the web transforms from one spatially and locationally grounded (in URL’s, permalinks and bookmarks) to a fully-mediated, amorphous zone of information.  In this new web, there are no wrong answers or incorrect URL’s, because the algorithm always has information relevant to the intent of our information need.

As Messina notes, the tradeoff is such “that our fundamental notions and expectations of privacy on the web have to change or will be changed for us. Either we do without tools that augment our cognitive faculties or we embrace them, and in so doing, shim open a window on our behaviors and our habits so that computers, computing environments and web service agents can become more predictive and responsive to them, and in so doing, serve us better.

That is, in embracing the mediated web, we trade (to some extent) our agency, any sense of privacy, and most importantly, our extant strategies of finding and reminding for new, less conceptually transparent ones.  To embrace the web in Chrome’s model, we must embrace the algorithm, and essentially invite it into our minds.  This new lens is all-or-nothing, and it casts away our strategies of past, those operationalized in pre-web design patterns.

On one hand, one might be able to argue that the web is so vast that inviting the algorithm home might make sense.  Perhaps it is better to browse with Google on your shoulder, assisting your navigation and selecting your best information choices.  Where I run into difficulty with this model is that Google is placed at a meta-layer above the web; it becomes the lens through which the web is experienced.  This model is troubling at many levels, but I particularly resent the idea the web should be mediated.  Slightly repurposing JPB’s Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace:

We have no elected government, nor are we likely to have one, so I address you with no greater authority than that with which liberty itself always speaks. I declare the global social space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to impose on us. You have no moral right to rule us nor do you possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear.

Of course, this isn’t a question of morals; the web is a market, and there will always be a choice to opt-out or not participate in Google or anyone else’s schemes.  The gray area emerges when we consider Google’s place in the market, and the sheer power they exert in the configuration of consumer preferences.  Thinking as an educator – we lament the so-called death of the book.  In five years, will we lament the death of the URL, in an age in which all authority is conferred through the end-product of a citation-based algorithm?

All of this comes with a grain of salt.  Personally, I believe our current spatial metaphors of the web will exist for the imaginable future.  As revolutionary as these ideas seem, we change slowly, and the browsing and searching patterns of billions of web users are already well-established.  Further, this sort of change is essential – we’re constantly reconfiguring the web and our experience of the web – I just question how much we need to do that with Google looking over our shoulder.


29
Aug 08

Firefox 3 Tweaks

I’ve recently moved to Firefox 3, and I’m pretty pleased with the performance.  Firefox 3 feels snappy, seems to handle JS and memory leaks well, and is all-around pretty impressive. Here are my tweaks:

I’m not a fan of the awesome bar – I simply don’t like interfaces (like Google Suggest) that create a lot of activity while I’m typing.  To disable the URL bar, set browser.urlbar.maxRichResults to -1.

Also worth noting is that the malware and phishing protection that come default in Firefox 3 do send your browsing history to Google.  This is not new from Firefox 2, but it is worth mentioning, as you are uniquely identified and correlated in the data.  To turn this off, de-select the two “Tell me…” options under Firefox’s Security settings.  I ran packet traces and verified this does stop Google data collection.


7
Jun 08

Linking Unit Structures

Interesting links from the past few days:


13
Dec 07

Google Toolbar: Trading Privacy for Convenience

I’ve long been skeptical of the Google Toolbar (and most other “toolbars”, for that matter). In utilizing the Google Toolbar and any of the “advanced” settings, you allow Google to track every webpage you visit. The Toolbar has always been a coup for Google – in creating this friendly, helpful tool, they’re able to collect clickstream data from hundreds of millions of people. No wonder they’re winning the search wars.

With the release of Version 5 of the Toolbar, Google has solved a critical problem with Toolbar data. That is, if you use a shared computer (or use Toolbar in a computer lab or library), Google has a hard time knowing who is actually using the computer. In the name of “portability”, Google has synced the Toolbar with your Google Account. You’re now able to carry all of your settings with you, and Google gets the benefit of knowing exactly whose data they are collecting. We’re now correlatable across computers.

Google is marketing these features with a very cute new video, which I think we’re supposed to believe is the work of three employees, and not an advertising firm. The message is clear: use our awesome new features, and benefit! Of course, if you use the new features, you’ve opted in for full-on data collection.

Facebook’s Beacon raised eyebrows because it forced us to confront that our data was being sent around, from place to place. The little Beacons reminded us that Facebook was watching and collecting. What if every time you loaded a webpage, the Google toolbar flashed a message “Google just recorded that sarah@gmail.com just visited http://espn.com at 11:30AM on December 12. 2007, Thank You!” I suppose we’d feel a little differently about things.


10
Nov 07

Data Sharing with Facebook’s Beacon

In my last post, I linked to a site that explains how to block Facebook Beacon. I recommend that post if you’re interested in preventing Facebook from knowing what you are doing on third-party sites. At the same time, GigaOM has been asking some important privacy questions; he wants to know what data third-party sites are sharing with Facebook.

Using a packet sniffer and the wonderful Firefox extension TamperData, I’ve got the answer – at least in one case. I looked at how Epicurious has integrated Facebook Beacon, and what I’ve found is rather troubling.

The actual implementation on Epicurious’ side is pretty simple; they make a script inclusion call to Facebook on recipe page loads. With the call, the javascript file http://facebook.com/beacon/beacon.js is loaded. This call happens regardless of your Epicurious login state (even if you don’t have an Epicurious accont) – Epicurious loads this javascript for both cases.

Here’s where things get interesting. When a browser loads a “page” or file, standard information is sent back to the web server. In this case, when you load an Epicurious page, you’re also loading a Facebook page. Among the standard information sent back to Facebook is your IP, your referer location, and a cookie. Your IP is the address of your home computer, your referer location is the URL you are viewing, and your cookie includes a little value called “c_user” – your Facebook ID. Here’s what the call looks like (sanitized with [] to remove private and superfluous info):

Host=www.facebook.comUser-Agent=Mozilla/5.0 []Accept=text/xml,application/xmlAccept-Language=en-us,en;q=0.5Accept-Encoding=gzip,deflateAccept-Charset=ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7Keep-Alive=300Connection=keep-aliveReferer=http://www.epicurious.com/recipes/food/views/1247213Cookie=c_user=[Faceook ID]; login_x=[Your FB login];Cache-Control=max-age=0

Therefore, regardless of your login state to Epicurious, any time you load (not just review) a recipe or any other Beacon-enabled page, Facebook knows exactly what you are looking at. In essence, this setup is sending your clickstream and path data to Facebook, precisely correlated to your Facebook identity. On Beacon-enabled pages, Facebook knows everything you do in Epicurious.

Caveats: I doubt that Facebook had much say in how Epicurious integrated, so it’s possible that this privacy leak is the fault of Epicurious, not Facebook. However, if Facebook’s integration plan is to have all its partners making Javascript include calls, this “information sharing” will be widespread. As a final note of caution, this is not much different from DoubleClick’s model; of course, with the public’s eye on Facebook, one can expect higher degrees of scrutiny for Facebook.


19
Oct 07

Google Toolbar on Public Computers: Information Leakage?

I don’t know if you share my experience at other universities, but I’ve noticed that some computer labs I’ve used have Google Toolbar installed. This is worrying; in its standard installation, the Google Toolbar sends “limited information” to Google. However, once one of the “advanced” features is enabled, the Google Toolbar sends all sorts of information to Google, including “the log information and additional information, such as the URLs you visit or the text on the page.”

Why is this an information leak? Well, if one student enables the advanced features, he or she has now opted-in every other user of the machine to sending all of their browsing information (OPAC searches, etc.) to Google. Of course, this will cease if the machine is reimaged or a student knows enough to turn these features off, but how often will that occur?

One can’t blame lab administrators for installing the toolbar – it is widely popular – but it is also a key component of Google’s data mining strategy. Would a university export its user’s server logs to third parties in any other circumstance? Not without a subpoena. Is it time to call on universities, libraries and other public computing spaces to remove the Google Toolbar? I think so.