Posts Tagged: politics


26
Feb 07

Wikipedia's Expansive Influence in Candidate Search Results

In a recent survey, I found that Wikipedia has an expansive influence in organic Google search results for 2008 presidential candidates. For each candidate, their Wikipedia entry is ranked no lower than 5th place by Google. In addition, the Wikipedia entry ranks higher than the election web presence of that particular candidate for 25% of Democrats and 60% of Republicans. There is no other entity on the web that plays such a systematically influential role in candidate information positioning as Wikipedia, pointing to its increased importance as a messaging tool in the 2008 cycle. A full breakdown of candidate search result positions follows:

Candidate Main Site Rank (1) Election Site Rank (2) Wikipedia Rank (3) Outrank? (4)
John Edwards 1 1 3 N
Joe Biden 1 3 5 N
Christopher Dodd 1 4 3 Y
Mike Gravel 1 1 3 N
Dennis Kucinich 3 1 5 N
Barack Obama 3 1 2 N
Bill Richardson 2 4 1 Y
Hillary Rodham Clinton 1 2 3 N
Sam Brownback 1 3 4 N
Rudy Giuliani 2 2 1 Y
Duncan Hunter 1 2 3 N
Mitt Romney 1 1 2 N
Jim Gilmore x (5) x (5) 1 Y
Mike Huckabee 2 2 1 Y
John McCain 1 x (5) 3 Y
Ron Paul 1 5 3 Y
Tom Tancredo 1 3 4 N
Tommy Thompson 2 4 1 Y

This is truly eye-opening data. Wikipedia’s influence is systematic and pervasive, perhaps to the point of overreaching. Should Wikipedia outrank a candidate’s electoral site? Clearly, this shows that monitoring Wikipedia is a must for every campaign – thankfully Wikipedia makes this easy with RSS-based monitoring.

Wikipedia’s role in the 2008 cycle will be interesting to follow. Over the next few months, I’ll be looking at candidate Wikipedia presence and attempting to make some sense of the possibilities.

Caveats about this data and methodology: This represents a one-time analysis of Google search results. These results may and will change over time. The queries were directed to Google.com, from a US-based location. Other Google national sites may provide dissimilar results. Queries were constructed exactly as transcribed – i.e. no quotes around names, or special techniques.

Footnotes:
(1) – This is the search rank of the candidate’s main site, if the candidate has a main site different from their electoral web presence. For example, John McCain or Dennis Kucinich’s Congressional web presence.
(2) – This is the search rank of the candidate’s electoral web presence, the home of their presidential campaign or their exploratory committee.
(3) – This is the search rank of the candidate’s main Wikipedia entry.
(4) – An “Outrank” is declared if the Wikipedia page outranks the candidate’s electoral web presence.
(5) – A result was not found in the top ten search results.


24
Feb 07

Understanding Candidate Facebook Groups

At this point, we’ve all heard the story of Farouk Olu Aregbe’s Facebook group “Barack Obama (One Million Strong For Barack).” As of this writing, the group is less than 1000 members away from a total membership count of 300,000. This is somewhat of a stunning achievement, especially when you consider that no other candidate has a group that even compares to this group’s size.

As far as I can tell, Aregbe is not affiliated with the Obama campaign. He is a connected, concerned supporter but nothing more. At the same time, many other concerned supporters of other candidates have started Facebook groups – there are hundreds listed for the campaigns (and potential campaigns) I surveyed – Clinton, Obama, Edwards, McCain, Giuliani and Romney. None of these groups even come close to Aregbe’s group in terms of size. Why?

First, lets survey the state of Facebook groups for the political candidates. With the exception of the Clinton campaign (more on this later), the groups were fairly homogenous. Some groups supported the candidate, some groups opposed the candidate. There were a few global groups, with membership not exceeding 5000, with the average large group membership around 1000-2000. There are also many subgroups based on region (DC for..), interest group (College Students for..) or quip (If X wins the election, I’m moving to..). For each candidate there were many groups, with the majority of groups small (sub-100) and unnoticed.

The outlier in my survey was Clinton’s campaign, where opposition groups account for a large percentage of groups formed. In fact, the most significant group was one entitled “ANTI Hillary Clinton for president ’08“, which has nearly 48,000 members at my last count. This is clearly the largest candidate opposition group on Facebook, and its size is quite noteworthy. The tone among anti-Clinton groups was rather vile, with a number of groups (often created by high school students) advocating violence towards the candidate.

So what made Aregbe’s group special? Just as in the case of Ben Parr’s “Students Against Facebook News Feed”, the success of the group was somewhat arbitrary, but there were factors that contributed to its success. First, Aregbe’s group was properly timed. He created it the day after Obama’s video “A Message from Barack” made its way around the web. Unlike the inevitable campaign announcements of Edwards and Clinton, Obama’s announcement was a pleasant and noteworthy surprise to many. This, combined with the connected nature of Aregbe (his day job is advising college student government) made his timing and placement perfect. The message moved through his network (via Facebook news feeds) like wildfire, quickly arriving on the growth path that has let it to its success today. To boil things down a little more, this was a 1) perfectly-timed message sent to a 2) primed audience by a 3) maven/connector.

Perhaps this is why the other groups have failed. For a group to be as successful as Aregbe’s, it may need all of these factors simultaneously, which is a rare situation. In Parr’s case, he denies being a connector, though his message could have easily been picked up and carried forward by a connector. At the same time, Facebook makes it difficult for groups of large volume to form in this context. Since group searches are returned based on semantic match, and not on size, it may take someone clicking through 15 pages of returns before they come across the group with the largest number of participants.

Does this mean that candidates won’t be able to engineer this process to build large Facebook groups? In fact, if they optimize their offerings, I think they will also be able to create large Facebook groups.

  • First, the group must be strategically named – the candidate’s name must be in the group name and description. At the same time, since group searches are returned alphabetically, a group name like America for Candidate X will return before Candidate X for President.
  • Second, there must be an opportune time. Obama’s announcement got everyone talking – and since at that point Obama occupied more cognitive space than other candidates, people were primed for Obama. Since candidates can’t announce again, what can they do for an encore? Well, a scandal (America supports Candidate X) or especially noteworthy event (America is proud of Candidate X) might create opportune timing.
  • Third, the candidate will likely be the connector. If the candidate appeals to the audience directly to join their Facebook group, their centrality could spark viral growth.

Even if they do all of these things, success is not guaranteed. There are only a few very large groups in Facebook, so there is certainly some magic in the process. But groups are valuable. Group membership is an identity statement, one that influences the cohort. Group membership creates a place for supporters to come together to discuss, learn and share. Perhaps more importantly, groups are huge mailing lists – the group owner can message every groups member directly. I haven’t a clue what the election laws say about this if a group was candidate-managed, but a list of that size and concentration is enviable in any situation.


11
Feb 07

Social Networks and Political Campaigns: A Web 2.0 Manifesto

I’ve been following the launch and reaction to Barack Obama’s social network offering, my.barackobama.com. While the intersection of politics and social networks are anything but new (they were utilized effectively by a number of Democratic candidates in the 2006 cycle), the private-label social network offering by a presidential candidate is new. I’ve enjoyed a couple of reactions to Obama’s social network, particularly Fred Wilson’s and Tony Hung’s. I’ll be the first to admit that this is somewhat uncharted territory, so I’ll approach my analysis somewhat gently. To that extent, though, I think there’s a significant amount of best practice that we’ve learned from other social networks that will be directly relevant to Obama’s offering (as well as the other candidates that will inevitably launch social networks).

By launching a private-label social network, Obama’s campaign achieves two goals. First, it gets people talking, particularly the neterati who care about these things. It establishes Obama as a net-savvy candidate, in an election cycle that will increasingly play to the mores of the social web. Second, it sets a precedent. I believe that the other mainline candidates will follow Obama’s lead, and there are likely a whole host of vendors salivating at the chance to represent a political candidate with their private-label SNS.

At the outset, Obama’s site is inoffensive. There’s not a whole lot you can do, interactivity is somewhat limited, and the site lacks the dynamic feel that I’ve come to expect from social networks. However, this isn’t a terrible strategy. I believe that putting simple, core features in the hands of users and iterating on top of those features is a fair plan (if that is the plan). The fact Obama’s site has a 4 second reload on everything you do is completely bizarre, however, and should be fixed quickly. It is a little too DIY-feeling for a presidential candidate.

With all social networks or communities, the ultimate question to be answered is “What goal is the technology helping achieve?” In the case of Obama’s network, it really isn’t clear what purpose the network serves. Sure, I can log in and find other people, or blog, look up an event, but isn’t that much easier on a site like Facebook, where the Obama group “Barack Obama (One Million Strong for Barack) already has 250,000 members? Ironically, Obama himself doesn’t even belong to this group (Note to the Obama web people, wake up and embrace the social media). By attempting to create a social network to solve a need that other social networks have solved, is Obama just reinventing the wheel?

In the 2008 election cycles, different networks will serve different purposes. Facebook, Myspace and the other premier social networks will undoubtedly serve as connection vectors for followers of political candidates. Why? Network effect. There are always going to be more people on Myspace or Facebook than on Barack Obama, or Hillary Clinton, or Sam Brownback’s social network. As such, it is absolutely important for campaigns to realize that they’ll always be competing with (and losing to) these social networks. So what good does a private label network provide?

The answer lies in answering situationally relevant information needs of individuals in a simple, low-involvement fashion. The candidate’s social network should serve as the nexus of information about the candidate. It should be the place that I can go to to find anything and everything about the candidate, information about events, snippets and facts I can blog about, heavy integration of social media such as Flickr or Youtube so I can experience everything about the candidate in a single place. It should not try to act as the sole vector between the candidate’s supporters. In fact, doing so could be significantly harmful, as it might give supporters the impression that this private-label group is the only netgroup that supports the candidate, obviously leaving aside the millions that support the candidate in other groups.

My vision of the purpose these networks would serve is actually quite simple. The information need is clear: people need to know stuff about the candidate they support. The candidate they support is a lifestyle brand. The social network is the perfect place to embrace this lifestyle brand, in the sense that it connects information sharers. What if I logged into Obama’s social network and what I saw where 15 great Flickr pictures, all creative-commons licensed, that I could easily upload to my blog. What if I logged in an I could find a set of widgets that I could post on Myspace, Bebo or that would update my network with information about Obama, or even things like his travel schedule (“See Obama Here!”) or fundraising goals (“Help me raise the last 10% for Obama”). What if I logged into Obama’s network and I saw a list of Obama groups in other networks (“Join the 250,000 supporters on Facebook!”). In the words of community marketer extraordinare Tara Hunt – what if Obama “embraced the chaos.”

In reality, 2008 is going to be about the enmeshing of networks. Some of the action that goes on in the networks will be centrally maintained, but some (as in the example of the Facebook group) will be produced by people external to the campaign. Should candidates put their head in the sand and act like the external work doesn’t exist? Absolutely not. The simple reality is that by embracing social media, communities are going to play a significant role in the creation of the candidate. Like it or not, some of Obama’s online identity is going to be created by the Facebook group, over which he has no control. The millions of users who embrace Obama in one way or another will get their messages from a number of different sources, so central control is effectively impossible.

This is not to say that centrally-managed efforts like Obama’s social network are useless. Indeed, they’re anything but. I believe that, properly managed, such communities could play an absolutely integral part of the 2008 cycles. However, to understand how to use these tools, candidates must look at how community marketing has changed in the advent of Web 2.0. Companies like Youtube and Myspace succeeded because they embraced openness (Youtube was largely unknown until it let people embed their videos in Myspace, for example). The candidate who embraces this mentality will make the most sense to the netvoter, as our sensibilities have changed significantly over the past few years.

To boil this concept down to its essence, candidates must remember that while they play an important part in their strategy, they are not the sole drivers. In the coming cycle, external individuals who get social media will harness lots of eyeballs on behalf of the candidate. This is going to happen – it is already happening. Candidates must embrace this and ally with these efforts, and they truly represent the expanse of the support provided to the candidate.

Candidates must also realize the role their technology plays, and the disadvantage they have when competing in the marketplace. As hard as they may try, a private-label social network is never going to compete with a site like Facebook. So don’t even try. However, the private-label social network can be the nexus for important, useful information. Instead of trying to own a significant amount of the voter’s online time, try and own 5 very useful minutes in which you provide them with good links to external resources, rich media. Make it a hub. Make it a something of a placeful RSS aggregator that is edited by someone on the campaign that truly gets social media. Hire someone that truly gets social media.

Individuals are going to come to candidates with a significant information need. They are going to look for community, and connections, and answers. In 2008, the network that represents a candidate is going to be spread across many services, it will be controlled by many players, and the marketplace of ideas will lift some of the best efforts to the top. The Web 2.0 candidate will harness the community’s work, and create a place that solves the information need of the people interested in the candidate. Make no mistake, the candidate of 2008 is competing in the marketplace, so he or she must figure out what they can do, and do well, and concentrate on that. Obama’s site, and the others that will come, have a good bit of work to do before they’re truly useful to their audience. Lets hope they get the message that the web has changed significantly since 2004, and they adjust their strategies accordingly.


20
Nov 06

Case Study: Facebook Feeds and Networked Political Action

Lately, I’ve been thinking about SNS and networked political action. As a result, I’ve put together this small report on the Facebook feeds fiasco. I’ve posted the report here to my blog, but it will likely be easier for you to just download it as a PDF. I’m not exactly sure what I’m going to do with this report, hence no APA-style cites, but I wanted to jot this info down before it left my mind. I think what happened on the Facebook between 9/5/2006 and 9/7/2006 was very important, and will figure into my dissertation. Anyway, enjoy, and please feel free to comment/critique/add information, as I will certainly be revising this document later.

Fred Stutzman, UNC-Chapel Hill
fred@metalab.unc.edu

Case Study: Facebook Feeds and Networked Political Action

9/5/2006
Around midnight-1AM Eastern, Facebook mini-feeds were rolled out. Assorted LiveJournal users noticed and mentioned the service.

  • http://apolloli.livejournal.com/9670.html – “Look at the new interface with feeds and mini feeds. I should really quit facebook and mind my own business more. Facebook is a cyber-drug!”
  • http://under-pressure.livejournal.com/318712.html – “Facebook apparently decided a few hours ago to officially become stalkerbook; it now requires no effort whatsoever to track your friend or acquaintance’s every Internet move. Thanks, big brother. Thanks.”

As evidenced, initial reaction in the blogosphere was negative, with many users claiming invasion of privacy. A-list bloggers, on the other hand, generally gave the service a thumbs-up. Throughout the morning of the 5th, discontent amongst users grew, with a number of users forming groups against the Facebook feeds.

Sometime during the morning of the 5th, Ben Parr, a junior at Northwestern University, created a group entitled “Students Against Facebook News Feed (Official Petition to Facebook).” In interviews (1,2), Ben states that he created the group, told a few friends, and went to lunch. When Ben returned from lunch, the group had grown to over 13,000 users.

Two main factors influenced the rapid expansion of the Students Against Facebook News Feed (SAFNF) group. First, the Facebook feed product was introduced poorly, causing discontent within the Facebook from the very beginning. The product was an invasive change that affected privacy expectations in the site. Furthermore, users were not prepared for the change in advance, nor were they able to opt-out of the service.

The second factor was an artifactual element of the Facebook feeds. The general purpose of the Facebook feed product is to inform the cohort of actions taken by a Facebook users. Common actions include writing on a wall, editing profile information, or joining or leaving groups. When a user logs in to Facebook, they were immediately presented with the last actions of their friend network.

On the morning of the 5th, Ben Parr’s friends saw that he created a group in the Facebook. They joined his group to show solidarity with his feelings about Facebook feeds. When they did join the group, that action was recorded on their news feeds, and thereby broadcast out to their entire friend network. As the average collegiate Facebook user has hundreds of friends, this action of solidarity in joining SAFNF became a living, viral advertisement for the SAFNF group. Each time someone who had a friend that joined SAFNF logged in, they were presented with a message alerting them to their friend’s intentions. As sentiment went pervasively negative against feeds, more people joined SAFNF, thereby virally spreading the group.

In the Facebook, groups are arbitrary affiliation vectors. Groups can be whimsical, such as a group named after a movie quote, or serious, such as a group dedicated to volunteering. Groups are costless to join, and they simply require a click of the mouse to join. Many users partake in a large number of groups; groups are generally thought of as a low-involvement way to make identity statements. Although barriers to group entry are low, this does not mean that group membership lacks meaning or consequence. As groups scale sufficiently, they become means for a mass audience to express a viewpoint. In Ben Parr’s case, the viewpoint was anger over the Facebook feeds, and it turns out his group was instrumental in the movement against the product.

Throughout the afternoon of the 5th, many users joined SAFNF. At 9PM Eastern, the group had grown to 30,000 members. Just two hours later, at 11PM Eastern, the group had over 45,000 members. (3) At the same time, users reportedly started venting their frustration on the Facebook blog (http://blog.facebook.com). According to an unverified thread (4), users left over 600 comments about the service, “every single one negative.” The Facebook blog reportedly removed commenting, and has never allowed commenting on its blog since. The group started growing at a sustained pace of approximately 15-20,000 new users per hour into the morning of the 6th. Reports have the SAFNF count at 90,000 members at 1AM on September 6. (5) By 3:45AM Eastern, Mark Zuckerberg issued the blog post that told Facebook users to “Calm Down. Breathe. We hear you.” (6)

As users woke up on the morning of September 6th, they were inundated with messages showing that members of their friend network had joined SAFNF. Over the course of the 6th, SAFNF membership was reported at: 300,000 members at 11AM Eastern, 400,000 members at 3PM Eastern, 500,000 members at 8PM Eastern. (7) At the same time, many users were voicing their frustration on the SAFNF discussion board. By midnight on the 6th, over 2600 messages had been posted in the discussion forum. (8)

Up until this point, the main coverage of the Facebook feeds event happened in the blogosphere, with a number of high-profile blogs (Techcrunch, Scobelizer) weighing in on the fiasco. On the morning of the the 7th, the Wall Street Journal, Washington Post and Los Angeles Times all ran coverage of what was being dubbed the Facebook Feeds Fiasco. (9,10,11) Throughout the course of the 7th, the group swelled to 750,000 members, representing almost 8% of the entire Facebook population.

On the night of the 7th, Ben Parr made the following announcement via the SAFNF website.

- I was read a statement from facebook by a news organization. Perhaps by tomorrow, there will be a feature to remove yourself from facebook news feeds, based on categories. This group will reserve judgement until we see the privacy upgrades implimented.

I think we’ve won, people. I think we’ve won.
- Ben (12)

At this point, the group had essentially accomplished its mission. The Facebook had agreed to make substantial changes to the news feeds, which were later documented in a post to the Facebook blog. Early on the morning of September 8, Mark Zuckerberg wrote:

We really messed this one up. When we launched News Feed and Mini-Feed we were trying to provide you with a stream of information about your social world. Instead, we did a bad job of explaining what the new features were and an even worse job of giving you control of them. I’d like to try to correct those errors now. (13)

On the night of the 8th, the Facebook introduced privacy controls to the feed product, allowing users the ability to opt-out of the feeds. Zuckerberg neglected to mention the SAFNF group, but it is commonly believed that the SAFNF action played a significant role in forcing the Facebook to roll back its feeds product. On the 8th, dozens of newspapers ran stories documenting the feeds fiasco, and the community response.

Key Facts (All data approximate)

- 9/5/2006, feeds introduced
- 9/5/2006, SAFNF created.
o 9/5/2006 Midnight membership 90,000 (Eastern, approximate)
o 9/6/2006 Midnight membership 600,000 (Eastern, approximate)
o 9/7/2006 Midnight membership 750,000 (Eastern, approximate)
- To date, over 5200 unique discussion threads on the SAFNF
o 9/5/2006, First post at 1:52PM
o 9/5/2006, 500 threads generated.
o 9/6/2006, 2100 threads generated.
o 9/7/2006, 1260 threads generated.
o 9/8/2006, 450 threads generated.
- Blog posts about SAFNF (via Google Blogsearch)
o 9/5/2006, 26 posts.
o 9/6/2006, 137 posts.
o 9/7/2006, 103 posts.
o 9/8/2006, 95 posts.

Summary Analysis

1. Rollout
The Facebook news feeds are a valuable case study in botched software rollouts. First and foremost, the rollout was a substantial new feature that effectively changed the privacy dynamic in the service. Second, the users were kept in the dark about this change until the last moment, when it was rolled out to all members. Third, users were not allowed to disable the rollout, nor were they able to do anything about it. The rollout was further complicated because it contained retroactive data, i.e. news feed items prior to the launch. Users were very uncomfortable with this rollout and used any means necessary to voice their opinions; they turned to blogs, messages, wall posts and ultimately, the SAFNF group.

2. Students Against Facebook News Feeds
There are currently approximately 150 groups on the Facebook that are “against” the Facebook news feeds. Their membership ranges from the tens on the low side to low thousands on the high side. How did this one group gain such immense popularity? These reasons are speculative, but one can assume the following. First, Ben Parr and his friends were very active Facebook users. They likely had large friend groups, comprised of active users. They were likely also influential Facebook users. As the influential Facebook users joined SAFNF, the network effect started very quickly. Soon, the group had spread within the entire network, so that users at virtually every institution had a friend or two that had joined SAFNF. The most important reason for the spread of SAFNF, interestingly, is the news feed product. Because users could see the groups their cohort was joining, they were instantly made aware of the SAFNF group, as well as being influenced to join the group. This made for very pervasive spread of the group’s goal.

3. Facebook response
The Facebook initially did not respond to the SAFNF group. Over the course of the 5th and 6th, many employees of the Facebook created and joined groups that supported the Facebook feeds product. Many of these groups were derogatory to users who did not support the feeds product. Mr. Zuckerberg’s initial blog posting (6) was also widely considered a blow-off to the users of the Facebook concerned about the product. His message served to inflame the users, with many responding negatively to Mr. Zuckerberg in the SAFNF comment thread.

4. General concerns
Users generally considered the introduction of Facebook feeds as a privacy invasion. They commonly resorted to calling the Facebook by its nickname, the “Stalkerbook”, in blog posts. Many users considered the Facebook to truly be the “Stalkerbook” with the introduction of feeds. Interestingly, once Facebook introduced privacy features, users welcomed the service, with many users starting groups dedicated to admitting that they enjoyed the feeds product.

5. What went wrong
The botched rollout of the feeds, combined with perceived arrogance on behalf of the Facebook employees contributed heavily to the user revolt of 9/5-9/7. Facebook neglected to take into account users privacy and identity expectations, and they came off looking like they were playing loose and fast with a very fundamental aspect of the user’s experience. The fact Facebook completely neglected to introduce privacy functions was likely the largest motivator for the revolt. How product managers of Facebook neglected such an important feature is likely a result of groupthink, in which Facebook employees lacked the perspective of the average user. Had the Facebook introduced privacy features from the beginning, it is clear that the revolt of 9/5-9/7 would not be anywhere near as significant as it was.

Networked Political Action

The feeds fiasco is an important example of networked political action. In the course of just a few days, hundreds of thousands of users bonded together to express their negative opinion about the feeds product. This action was pervasive and effective, and completely organic.

A combination of message validity, timing, and network dynamics was responsible for the effectiveness of the action. Because the users were at stake, this drove participation. Further, participation was driven by the simplicity of the action – to make a statement, users simply needed to join the group. At a small scale, this simple action of joining a group has limited value, but at scale the group grows very powerful. The creation of large groups on Facebook is now somewhat of a game in the service.

The particular circumstances of the feeds fiasco are responsible for some of the success of the campaign, but there are some key takeaways. First, it is interesting to see that users understand the value of signifying political intention with group membership. Theoretically, groups could grow quite valuable as a democratic messaging platform within social network services. It is also interesting to see how rapidly information diffiuses through SNS networks. We know that 8% of Facebook joined the group, but it is obvious that many more didn’t, but were still exposed to the message of the group. Therefore, groups are excellent collective message dissemination vehicles. At scale, groups could easily reach all members of the SNS.

In a SNS, there is no notion of a democracy. Users are subject to the rules, regulations and changes in the SNS. As a result, the users will resort to using in-network means to express their voice. As we have seen, users can effectively leverage their collective will to influence the “rulers” of the sites in which they inhabit. Obviously, this type of action has interesting implications going forward.

Sources

1. http://maroon.uchicago.edu/online_edition/?p=27
2. http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1532225,00.html
3. http://tech.cybernetnews.com/2006/09/05/26000-members-petition-facebooks-news-feed/
4. http://gigaom.com/2006/09/05/facebook-makes-itself-useful/#comment-190185
5. http://olaoluwa.blogspot.com/2006/09/facebooks-changes-good-or-bad.html
6. http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=2208197130
7. http://www.insidefacebook.com/2006/09/06/scared-students-protest-facebooks-social-dashboard-grappling-with-rules-of-attention-economy/
8. http://unc.facebook.com/board.php?uid=2208288769&f=2&start=2600
9. IN BRIEF / INTERNET; Facebook’s Tracking Feature Draws Protests, Los Angeles Times, 9/7/2006.
10. New Facebook Features Have Users in An Uproar. Jamin Warren and Vaughini Vara, Wall Street Journal, 9/7/2006.
11. In Online Social Club, Sharing Is the Point Until It Goes Too Far, Susan Kinzie and Yuki Noguchi, Washington Post, 9/7/2006.
12. http://chimprawk.blogspot.com/2006/09/facebook-relents.html
13. http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?m=9&y=2006


7
Sep 06

Facebook Relents

Update: The “Facebook is closing” message you have received is a hoax. Facebook is not closing, you will not have your profile deleted, you will not have to pay any money! Feel free to delete that message and continue about your day.

———

From the Students Against Facebook News Feed group:

****Thursday Night Update****

- I was read a statement from facebook by a news organization. Perhaps by tomorrow, there will be a feature to remove yourself from facebook news feeds, based on categories. This group will reserve judgement until we see the privacy upgrades implimented.

I think we’ve won, people. I think we’ve won.
- Ben

The group has grown to almost 700,000 users, representing almost 8% of Facebook’s total user base. If the equivalent happened in Myspace, the group would have grown to 8 million people. In two days.

Amazing.